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On the Determinants of Cross Border Co-operation of Austrian 
Firms with Central and Eastern European Partners 
Abstract 
We analyse cross–border co-operation of Austrian firms with CEEC partners. Firm size, previous experience 
with co-operation and depth of integration with the most important partner are more important determinants of 
co-operation than distance to the closest potential partner. Firms with experience of co-operation are more 
likely to enter business relationships and less likely not to co-operate. Small firms are unlikely to co-operate in 
incentive contracts, while firms which are part of production networks typically co-operate in business and 
ownership relationships. Distance to the closest potential partner increases the probability of not co-operating 
and reduces the probability of ownership relationships.  
Introduction 
Austria experienced a remarkable increase in the internationalisation of its economy in the last decade. The 
opening of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECS) was one of the driving forces for this development. 
30% of Austrian foreign direct investments abroad were invested in the CEECs in 1998. Aside from this, the 
opening of CEECs also had implications for forms of cross – border relationships of firms, not so well 
documented by official data, such as franchising, subcontracting, long term supplier relationships and informal 
networks. With the planned enlargement of the European Union it has often been argued (e.g. BRESSAND and 
CSAKI, 1992 and KRÄTKE, 1998) that as integration proceeds, transboundary production networks should 
emerge. Furthermore, it is often stated (SCHMIDT, 1997) that these networks will have a regional dimension, 
favouring regions closer to the border. Case studies concerning East-West cross – border co-operation of 
particular industries (e.g. in a recent collective volume edited by Zysman and Schwarz, 1998) and border regions 
(e.g. SCHMIDT, 1998 and SCHMIDT and GERLING, 1998) by contrast suggest that both the extent of cross border 
networking has been low and relationships with CEECs are dominated by hierarchical structures based on joint 
or sole ownership by western partners.  
This paper uses a data set of Austrian firms - as one of the countries most strongly affected by the opening of 
CEECs - to study the role of various factors in forming cross-border inter-enterprise co-operation. In particular  
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we argue that different forms of co-operation - such as ownership relationships, incentive contracts (franchising 
and subcontracting) and lose business relationships - may depend differently on certain variables – such as 
distance to the closest partner, firm size, previous experience with co-operation and expectations of future 
developments. We use econometric techniques to determine the relative importance of these factors in the 
conclusion of different types of co-operation agreements. To our knowledge this issue has not yet been analysed 
with such methods for cross border networks.
1 One variable of particular interest in this context is distance 
between potential partners in forming co-operations, since the advantages of small distances between partners in 
forming co-operation, may not pertain to all possible legal forms. If different forms of co-operation require 
different intensities of personal interaction and distance between potential partners is a measure of the cost of 
interaction, forms of co-operation which require much interaction should be preferred by partners close to each 
other and firms which are far from one another should chose co-operations which require less personal contact.  
The paper also extends previous analysis on Austria in a number of ways: First, in contrast to earlier descriptive 
work on our data set, which has focused on the problems faced by co-operating firms in the CEE and the 
impediments to co-operation (AIGINGER and CZERNY, 1998) or on the regional distribution of co-operating firms 
(ALTZINGER et al, 2000) this paper analyses the determinants of entering a co-operation agreement. Second, the 
paper extends the analysis of business networks within Austria conducted on other data sets (FISCHER and 
VARGA, 1999; KAUFMANN and TÖDTLING, 1998, STEINER and HARTMANN, 1998) to the analysis of cross border 
activities of firms, which may be of particular relevance for a small open economy such as Austria. Third, it 
extends the analysis concerning Austrian FDI’s in CEECs (ALTZINGER and BELLAK, 1998 and PFAFFERMAYR, 
1999) to other relationships. In the next section we present the theoretical arguments which guide our analysis. In 
section three we describe the data set. Section four presents the econometric method and reports results. Section 
five summarises. 
Theoretical Starting Points  
The last decades have brought forth new forms of industrial organisation which are not easily classified within 
the traditional co-ordination mechanisms of markets and ownership. These have been given different names such 
as networks (GRABHER, 1993), clusters (PORTER, 1990), clans (OUCHI, 1980) and hybrids (MENARD, 1996). 
While these terms differ in contents, their common focus is the idea, that the extent and nature of relationships  
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among firms is important to regional development, and that such relationships combine elements of both 
hierarchical and market co-ordination. The role of distance and firm size in establishing such networks are a 
central theme in the regional economics literature. In particular it has been found that regional networks are 
based on tightly knit webs of contacts among primarily small and medium sized enterprises located close to each 
other and that there is a link between the structure and density of networks and regional development and 
innovation (see: BALESTRI, 1994, BAYER, 1994, BOSCHMA, 1999 and GRAZIANI  1998, KAUFMANN  and 
TÖDTLING, 2000 and GROTZ and BROWN, 1997).  
Industrial and organisational economists by contrast have focused on individual firms’ decisions to enter a 
relationship. According to transaction cost theory (WILLIAMSON, 1991) firms choose a form of co-operation to 
minimise transaction costs. In this theory, costs associated with building co-operation are not independent of the 
type of relationship chosen. FORSGREN  and JOHANSON  (1992) for instance differentiate between business 
relationships and strategic relationships. In strategic relationships a formal contract exists between partners; in 
business relationships such a contract does not exist. In consequence in strategic relationships the continuity and 
commitment to the relationship is regulated by legal norms. In business relationships they have to be redefined 
repeatedly. Thus building and maintaining “trust” among partners (see: LORENZ, 1998, LORENZEN, 1998, 
SCHMITZ, 1999) are important elements of transaction costs of such relationships. There is, however, also 
heterogeneity among contractual relationships. In particular there are differences in the kind of incentives 
provided by different contracts. In relationships based on ownership principals provide only limited incentives to 
agents. Thus control by the owner is the major method to secure motivation. In incentive contracts (such as 
franchising and licensing) by contrast incentives are provided. In consequence controlling agents will be less 
important (see: YEUNG, 1994). 
This suggests a typology of inter-firm co-operation which distinguishes between the role played by different 
forms of transaction costs and the importance of building and maintaining trust. In such a typology a difference 
has to be made between forms of co-operation which are based on (majority and minority) ownership, where 
principal agent problems are most important, incentive contracts (such as franchising and licensing), where 
incentives are provided for by contract, and business relationships, which are not based on formal contracts and 
where building and maintaining trust will be more important.  
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If different forms of co-operation require different intensities of personal interaction and distance between two 
partners is a measure of the cost of such interaction, the choice of form of co-operation will depend on distance. 
In particular we would expect distance between potential partners to play a role in the formation of ownership 
contracts, since it can be considered a proxy for the costs of controlling agents, and potentially in relationships 
dependent on trust and commitment, to the extent that maintaining such trust and commitment requires personal 
interaction. Distance between actors is not the only influence on creation of inter-enterprise co-operation, 
however. The probability of co-operation also depends on a number of other firm specific characteristics: In 
most models of foreign direct investment, for instance, the decision to invest inter alia depends on the expected 
future development of the country under consideration (CAVES,  1996). Thus expectations about the future 
development of the receiving countries should be reflected in the choice of co-operation. Also empirical 
evidence (AMIR and WODERS 1998, CASSIMAN and VEUGELERS, 1999) points to a higher probability of co-
operation for larger firms. These firms are more likely to have specialised resources for creating and 
administering relationships, and can thus handle co-operation agreements at a lower cost. Similarly, firms with 
previous experience of co-operation can be expected to have such specialised resources. Finally, a number of 
studies (CASSON and COX, 1992, RALLET and TORRE, 1998) argue that enterprise culture and ownership form 
may have an impact on the choice of relationship. In particular firms acquainted with more open information 
may find it easier to credibly communicate and co-operate with partners abroad.  
Data 
Our data stems from a questionnaire conducted among 505 Austrian firms.
2 These were asked whether they co-
operate with a partner from the CEECs, and whether they were also co-operating with a partner from the EU or 
within Austria. Furthermore, firms co-operating with CEEC partners were asked detailed questions on the 
number of co—operations, the legal form of co-operation (majority ownership, minority ownership, franchising, 
licensing or other) and the goal of the most important co-operation (sales, production, service). Finally, firms 
were asked to evaluate their expectations of the future development on a scale from 1 (very good) to 5 (very 
bad). 
3 From this data we construct a variable which in accordance with theoretical considerations differentiates 
between three types of co-operation. These are first, ownership contracts in which the responding firm stated that  
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the relationship was based on either a majority or a minority stake in the CEE partner, second, relationships 
based on incentive contracts such as franchising and licensing and finally, all relationships where the firm 
responded to have another form of co-operation. We interpret this last group to represent mainly business 
relationships. We focus on the relative importance of the following variables in determining the probability to 
form a co-operation: 
1)  Road distance to the nearest border from the address of the firm under consideration - We use this variable 
as a proxy measure for the distance to the nearest potential partner. This allows us to measure the impact of 
distance even for non-co-operating firms, where distance between actual partners cannot be measured. This 
is necessary to identify the role of distance in the decision of firms not to co-operate but comes at the cost of 
not being able to identify the actual distance of co-operation. In the context of our analysis this may be less 
of a problem, because a) we focus exclusively on neighbouring CEECs of Austria (Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia) thus limiting the geographic extent of co-operation and b) because a 
minimum requirement for networks based on proximity to emerge would be a ceteris paribus higher chance 
of firms in border regions to engage in co-operation.  
2)  Firm Size – we use dummy variables for firms employing 1 – 49 and 50 - 99 employees, respectively. The 
reference category are firms with 100 or more employees.
4 Firm size may have a different impact on the  
form of co-operation chosen, if for instance, small firms face liquidity constraints and are thus less likely to 
engage in ownership based relationships or incentive contracts require specialised resources, which small 
firms are less likely to possess. 
3)  Proxies for the organisation of firms – here we use a dummy variable for unincorporated companies as well 
as for public limited companies as a proxy for enterprise culture and openness to co-operation. The 
reference category are private limited liability companies. Aside from proxying for differences in enterprise 
culture this variable may be again correlated with access to capital markets and may thus have differential 
impact on different forms of co-operation. 
4)  Dummies concerning the expected economic development in the CEECs as a proxy for the profits expected 
by the firm from engaging in a business activity in the CEE. -. Based on the information concerning firms  
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expectations of future developments in CEECs we formed a dummy which takes on the value one if the 
firms` management expects a positive (i.e. either very good or good) development and 0 else.  
5)  Dummies for previous experiences with co-operation - we include a dummy to measure previous experience 
with international and national co-operation which takes on the value 1 if the respective firm stated that it 
also co-operated with other partners from the EU or Austria, respectively. This variable was included to 
account for potential increasing returns to scale in co-operation activities.  
Furthermore, we include a dummy variable if the firm is located in the south of Austria (Carinthia or Styria), 
because political problems of former Yugoslavia in the last decade may have prevented co-operation. Measuring 
distance to the border of Slovenia for the south could thus distort results. Finally, we control for firms which are 
part of production networks by including a dummy variable which takes on the value of one if the most 
important co-operation (in EU and CEE countries) mainly serves production. This variable is a proxy for the 
depth of integration in international networks of the respective firm and the nature of networks. Since franchising 
and subcontracting are more afine to sales than production networks, we expect this variable to have a 
differential impact on forms of co-operation. 
Table 1 reports statistics concerning the co-operation activities of the sampled firms. The top panel shows the 
share of firms in border and non border regions (we define border regions as all territories within 100kilometres 
of the border) co-operating with a partner in at least one of three regions (EU, Austria, CEE). There is substantial 
interaction between CEECs and Austrian firms relative to co-operation within Austria or the EU. 41% of the 
firms sampled have at least one co-operation with a partner from the CEECs and 45% with the EU. Cross border 
co-operation is more important than co-operation within Austria. Only 36% of the firms have at least one co-
operation partner within Austria. This finding is consistent with previous research on R&D co-operations and 
reflects the smallness of the country. 
5 
 
{Table 1: Around here} 
 
The share of firms co-operating with at least one partner in the CEE is higher in border than in non – border 
regions as is the share of firms co-operation with EU  and Austrian partners. This can be attributed to the  
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economic structure of the Austrian border region. The three largest cities (Vienna, Graz and Linz) are all located 
within hundred kilometres from the border
6 and three of the five NUTS 2 regions bordering on the CEECs 
(Upper Austria, Lower Austria and Styria) are characterised by an industrial structure based on relatively large 
manufacturing firms, which may increase co-operative activity. 
The numbers reported in the top panel of table 1 do not add to a hundred percent, since a large share of firms co-
operate with partners from more than one region. This is shown in the bottom panel where all possible 
combinations of co-operation with the three regions are displayed, thus allowing for multiple partnerships. A 
large share of the firms (21.8%) co-operate with partners from all three regions considered, 8.5% of the firms co-
operate with CEECs only. 39% of the firms have no partnership at all. Interestingly the share of firms co-
operating exclusively with CEE partners is higher (9.1%) in non-border regions in border regions (8.1%), while 
for all other combinations the share of co-operating firms is higher in border regions.  
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of the independent variables. The average firm in our sample is located 
around 135 kilometres from the nearest border to the CEECs. Non – co-operating firms are located somewhat 
further from the border, than firms with an ownership based contract, incentive based co-operations are also 
closer. For other forms of co-operation distance to the border does not differ markedly from the average. Firms 
co-operating with the EU and other partners are clearly the most important category among co-operating firms. 
Only 22% of the firms not co-operating with CEE partners are co-operating with the EU as compared to 42% in 
the overall sample. The share of firms co-operating with EU partners is between 60% and 90% (depending on 
the co-operation) among firms co-operating with EU partners, by contrast. Finally, small firms are 
underrepresented among the co-operating firms.  
 
{Table 2: Around here} 
Results 
We model the choice between K different forms of co-operation as determined by the expected profit (πik) of this 
form of co-operation (k) for firm (i). The firm entering a particular co-operation decides simultaneously between  
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the forms of co-operation. Furthermore, we assume that expected profits of a particular co-operation depend 
linearly on the set Xi ={Xi1...XiN} of exogenous firm characteristics described above. Thus:  
(2)  ik i k k ik X b ξ α π + + =  
with  αk a scalar and βk a vector of parameters to be estimated and ξik a random variable, distributed 
independently across the choices (k). An appropriate econometric model for such a problem is a multinomial 
logit model (see: Greene 1993). This estimates the probability that a firm is in one of several possible states 
which are encoded as: no co-operation (0), ownership (1), incentive contract (2) and business relationship (3), 
relative to the probability of being in an arbitrarily chosen reference state
7.  
Results (reported in Table 3) suggest substantial heterogeneity in the determinants for each of the forms of co-
operation: Performing Wald tests of the hypothesis that the coefficients of a particular variable are equal to zero 
for each and every form of co-operation (MADDALA, 1983) we find all variables, but the dummy variables for 
the public limited liability companies, unincorporated companies and expectations (see: the last column of table 
3) have a significant impact on relative probabilities. For the distance variable, however, we can only reject the 
hypothesis at the 10% level. This is indication, that distance to the closest potential partner is less important in 
forming cross-border co-operation than other variables. Furthermore, testing the hypothesis that choices for the 
three forms of co-operations are determined in a similar fashion (i.e the null bk=bj. and bk=0 for a comparison 
with the base category) suggests that our variables discriminate well between co-operating and non co-operating 
firms as well as between ownership and business relationships (see the last three rows of table 3). We, however, 
cannot reject the null that incentive based contracts are similar to either ownership based or business 
relationships, which supports the suggestion of the theoretical literature that such incentive contracts are forms of 
co-operation “intermediary” to ownership and relatively lose forms. 
8 
 
{Table 3: Around here} 
 
Since relative probabilities are hard to interpret table 4 displays marginal effects for the variables included. 
These can be interpreted as the percentage point change in the probability to enter a particular form of co- 
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operation given a 1% deviation from the mean for continuous variables such as distance, and the percentage 
point change in the probability to enter a particular form of co-operation if a dummy variable changes from 0 to 
1.
9 
The impact of distance on the probability to co-operate is small relative to other determinants. A 1% deviation 
from the mean distance to the border increases the probability to have no co-operation by 0.05 percentage points 
and reduces the chances of having a ownership based relationship by –0,04 percentage points. Its impact on the 
probability to enter an incentive based contract (franchising or subcontracting) and business relationships is 
insignificant. An explanation for this may be that face – to – face contact may only be necessary in building trust 
rather than maintaining it, if such “trust contact” in for instance long term buyer - seller relationships, is 
mediated by meetings at neutral locations or by third parties, the need to form "trust" through personal contact in 
such relationships may be overemphasised..
10  
The presence of previous experience of co-operation with international partners is one of the most important 
determinants of co-operation. It, however, has impacts of different magnitude on different forms of co-operation. 
The presence of an international co-operation reduces the likelihood of having no co-operation at all by 33 
percentage points and increases the chances of a business relationship by 17 percentage points. The impact on 
contractual and ownership based forms of co-operation by contrast is small. The presence of an international co-
operation increases the probability of such an ownership based co-operation by only 11 percentage points. The 
impact on incentive based contracts remains insignificant. Experience with co-operation with Austrian partners 
by contrast has no significant impact on co-operation. 
Firm size also has an effect on the choice of form of co-operation. The probability of small firms with less than 
50 employees not co-operating is 19 percentage points higher than that of firms with more than 100 employees. 
While small firms co-operate significantly less in incentive based co-operations and slightly less in ownership 
based forms, medium sized firms co-operate slightly more in more lose forms of co-operation. Furthermore, 
unincorporated companies have a significantly lower chance of not co-operating with CEE partners.  
Enterprises in southern Austria co-operate less in all forms of co-operation. The strongest impact is found for 
ownership based relationships. This fits well with our conjecture that the political risks in the Balkans have 
impinged on the co-operation activities. Since political as well as economic risks are primarily relevant to  
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investment decisions, higher political risks should also primarily impact on ownership based forms of co-
operation. 
Finally, firms which are part of a producer network aside from facing a lower chance of not co-operating also co-
operate significantly more in ownership based and in business relationships. These results reflect the fact that 
franchising and subcontracting networks are more afine to the service and sales functions of enterprises. 
 
{Table 4: Around here} 
Conclusion 
This paper analyses the cross – border co-operation activities of Austrian firms with partners from CEECs. We 
focus on the relative importance of distance and other determinants in the decision to co-operate and the choice 
of form of co-operation. We find that firm size, previous experience with co-operation and depth of integration 
with the most important partner are more important determinants of the choice of co-operation than distance to 
partners. The importance of these determinants differs for different forms of co-operation. In particular firms 
with previous experience of co-operation are more likely to enter business relationships and less likely not to co-
operate at all. Small firms are less likely to co-operate and particularly unlikely to co-operate via incentive 
contracts, while firms which are part of production networks tend to co-operate more often in business and 
ownership based relationships. 
Furthermore, the probability of not co-operating increases with the distance to the closest potential partner. 
Distance has a negative impact on the probability of entering an ownership based relationship, but is 
uncorrelated with other forms of co-operation. The effect of distance is also small relative to the impact of other 
variables. Moving a 100 km from the nearest potential partner increases the probability of an ownership based 
co-operation by only 4%. Furthermore, our finding that the probability of entering a business relationship is 
independent of distance suggests that the role of face – to – face contact in maintaining trust in such relationships 
may be overrated.  
Our findings have implications for the kind of cross border networks, which can be expected to emerge in the 
course of integration of the CEECs. In particular they suggest that the role of distance in creating cross-border  
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networks is overemphasised relative to the importance of other factors such as experience with co-operation and 
firm size. The results suggest that cross - border networks based on proximity should emerge primarily in 
relationships involving direct investments in particular when larger firms are involved. Chances for 
unhierarchical cross border networks based on proximity, as envisaged by many for European border regions, do 
not seem to be likely outcomes for the immediate border regions. 
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Table 1: Patterns of Co-operation of Austrian firms 
 border1) non-border2) overall 
Involving EU  46.97  40.57  44.75 
Involving CEE  43.64  37.14  41.39 
Involving Austria  39.39  28.57  35.64 
None 35.76  45.14  39.01 
      
Austrian 6.67  3.43  5.54 
Austrian and EU  6.36  5.71  6.14 
Austria and CEE  2.42  1.71  2.18 
EU only  7.58  8.57  7.92 
EU and CEE  9.09  8.57  8.91 
CEE only  8.18  9.14  8.51 
All 23.94  17.71  21.78 
None 35.76  45.14  39.01 
 100.00  100.00  100.00 
1) Firms located less than 100 kilometres from the border 2) Firms located more than 100 kilometres from the 
border  
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Table 2: Means and Standard deviations  of independent variables by form of co-operation 
Variable Overall  No  Co-
operation 












Experience with co-operation (base category no co-operation) 
Co-operation  with  EU  partners*  0.42 0.22 0.63 0.78 0.89 
Co-operation  with  Austrian  partners*  0.50 0,33 0.71 0.83 0.90 
Firm size (base category firms with more than 100 employees) 
Less than 50 employees*  0.53  0.68  0.38  0.26  0.14 
50  to  99  employees*  0.32 0.22 0.40 0,35 0.64 
Expectations of future development (base category others) 
Good  or  very  good*  0.43 0.35 0.58 0.57 0.54 
Legal Form (base category private limited company) 
unincorporated  *  0.16 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.08 
public  limited  company*  0.06 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.13 
Control variables 
Firm located in the south of Austria 
(Styria or Carinthia)* 
0.13 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.08 
Most important cooperation serves the pupose of 
Production 
0.18 0.04 0.41 0.26 0.51 
       
No of firms  501  317  90  23  71 
(in  %)  100.00  63.27  17.96 4.59 14.17 
Note: Numbers in brackets refer to the standard deviations. Variables Indexed by * are Dummy variables. Their standard deviation is 
given by the square root of (1-mean)*mean  
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Table 3: Estimation results of Multinomial Logits (Dependent variable legform) 
 Coefficient. 
(Standard. Error) 
Wald tests for 
independent variables
a)
  All Firms 




Business rel versus 
None 
P- Value 
(Chi2 with 3 dof) 







Experience with co-operation (base category no co-operation) 














Firmsize (base category firms with more than 100 employees) 














Expectations of future development (base category others) 







Legal Form (base category private limited company) 















Firm located in the south of Austria 
























Hausmann tests of IIA assumption  
(Chi2 with 22 dof)b) 
2.306 0.681 1.503   
Wald test for merge with Incentive  
(Chi2 with 10 dof)c) 
0.779      
Wald test for merge with Business ( 
Chi2 with 10 dof) c) 
0.011 0.253     
Wald test for merge with None  
(Chi2 with 10 dof) c) 
0.000 0.000 0.000   
       
Log likelihood  -386.00 
Model chi – squared  152.37 
Pseudo R2  0.28 
Sample size  501 
Dependent variable: Form of Co-operation, Numbers in brackets are heteroskedasticity robust standard errors of the estimate, a) Ho: All 
coefficients associated with given variable(s) are 0 (P-Value) b) H0: Odds(Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other 
alternatives (χ2 values) c) Ho: All coefficients except intercepts associated with given pair of outcomes are 0 (i.e., categories can be 
collapsed) (P-Value).   
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Table 4: Marginal effects of estimates  
 none  Ownership  Incentive  Business 









Experience with co-operation (base category no co-operation) 
Co-operation with EU partners








Co-operation with Austrian partners








Firmsize (base category firms with more than 100 employees) 
Less than 50 employees








50 to 99 employees








Expectations of future development (base category others) 
Good or very good








Legal Form (base category private limited company) 
unincorporated








































Values in brackets are heteroskedasticity robust standard errors of the estimate, Variables designated by 1) are dummy variables. For 
these the marginal effects reported are the effects of a c.p. change  of the variable from 0 to 1 at the mean of all other variables. For 
distance the marginal effect is the partial derivative evaluated at the mean vector.   
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NOTES
  
1 Although the literature on franchising (see: KEHOE, 1998, LAFONTAINE and SHAW, 1996, DNES, 1996) uses 
similar techniques to establish findings in accordance with ours, this literature focuses on franchising networks 
within a country. We analyse a wider set of relationships in a cross border context between neighbouring 
countries. This may lead to different results, if borders represent an additional barrier to co-operation. 
2 A detailed description of the data is available in AIGINGER and CZERNY (1998). A copy of the questionnaire is 
available from the author upon request. 
3 Non co-operating firms were asked whether they were planning to co-operate, had already co-operated or were 
interested in co-operation. Furthermore, both co-operating and non-co-operating firms were asked detailed 
questions concerning problems and impediments to co-operation. These have been analysed in AIGINGER and 
CZERNY, 2000 and ALTZINGER et al 2002. We do not repeat this analysis. 
4 The choice of dummy variables rather than actual size is due to data limitations in the questionnaire. 
5 For instance, HUBER and KLETZAN (2000) report that 42% of the firms sampled in the community innovation 
survey co-operate with partners from the EU but only 36.6% with Austrian partners. 
6 MAYERHOFER and WOLFMAYER - SCHNITZER (1997) present evidence that in particular Vienna has attracted 
headquarter functions for CEECs. 
7 We chose the state 0 (no co-operation) as reference state. 
8 The independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) was tested by the test proposed by HAUSMANN  and MC 
FADDEN, (1984) We cannot reject the IIA assumption. Our model is thus well specified. 
9 Results are robust across a number of specifications: Exclusion of insignificant variables, exclusion of firm size 
dummies as well as inclusion of a large city dummy variable leave results qualitatively unchanged. Estimation 
including only firms with less than 100 employees or only manufacturing firms do not change qualitative results. 
Results are available from the author upon request. 
10 Unfortunately, this issue is beyond the scope of our data. We lack information on the how and under what 
circumstances co-operation agreements were concluded. Appendix: Robustness of Results 
To check for the robustness of our results we conducted a number of additional experiments. First, we omitted all 
insignificant variables (i.e. the AG, POSEXP and NATCOOP variables) from our regression. Second, we included a 
dummy variable which takes on the value 1 if the firm was located in one of the large cities (Vienna, Linz, Graz) of 
Austria to control for potential effects arising from headquarters. These variations change the quantitative estimates 
only minimally and leave the main qualitative findings untouched (see Tables A2 and A3). The dummy variable 
controlling for large cities fails to be significant, however, which is evidence in favour of our original specification. 
We were also concerned that firm size may be collinear with other explanatory variables such as the dummy for the 
presence of a co-operation with EU partners or the organisational form of the firm, thus we excluded the size dummies 
from our regression. (see Table A5) This changes the magnitude of coefficients which may be collinear with size (such 
as existing co-operations with the EU. It, however, also leaves the qualitative results of our regressions unchanged. 
Finally, we considered potential differences in coefficients across different kinds of firms. We hypothesise, that due to 
smaller capacities of acquiring information in small firms, distance could be more important in shaping their co-
operation behaviour. Thus we estimated equation (3) including only firms with less than 100 employees (see Table A1). 
Our results suggest few differences in the behaviour of small firms relative to that of large firms.
1 Although we find a 
higher marginal effect of distance on the probability to enter an ownership based co-operation, the increase relative to 
the overall sample is small. Also we find that positive expectations concerning the future development of the CEE have 
a more important impact on the probability to co-operate for small firms. In particular the probability of entering an 
ownership based co-operation is increased by better expectations of small firms.  
We also hypothesise that firms in manufacturing may be less sensitive to distance in their co-operation activities. Thus 
we estimated equation (3) focusing on manufacturing firms only (see Table A4). Again our hypothesis finds only weak 
support. The impact of distance on the probability changes by a small amount. Effects of previous co-operation on the 
probability to enter an incentive based co-operation are stronger for production enterprises and firm size has a more 
pronounced impact on the chances to enter a business relationship. In general, however, differences in the determinants 
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Table A1: Marginal effects of estimates for sub-groups of firms 
 None  Ownership  Incentive  Business 
  Small (less than 50 employees) firms only 


























































































































































Notes: see notes to table 4 
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Table A2: Estimation results of Multinomial Logits (Dependent variable legform) 









(Standard. Error)  


























(Chi2 with 3 
dof) 




































































































































           
Hausmann tests of IIA assumption  
(Chi2 with 16 dof)b) 
0.341 -0.211 -0.518  (Chi2 with 
24 dof)b 
5.494 0.652 0.643   
Wald test for merge with Incentive  
(Chi2 with 7 dof)c) 
0.523     (Chi2 with 
11 dof)c) 
0.761      
Wald test for merge with Business ( 
Chi2 with 7 dof) c) 
0.004 0.131    (Chi2 with 
11 dof)c) 
0.018 0.288     
Wald test for merge with None  
(Chi2 with 7 dof) c) 
0.000 0.000 0.000  (Chi2 with 
11 dof)c) 
0.000 0.000 0.000   
Log likelihood  -370.78  -367.41 
Model chi – squared  141.76  156.20 
Pseudo R2  0.27  0.28 
Sample size  501  501 
Dependent variable: Form of Co-operation, Numbers in brackets are heteroskedasticity robust standard errors of the estimate, a) Ho: All 
coefficients associated with given variable(s) are 0 (P-Value) b) H0: Odds(Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives (X2 
values)c) Ho: All coefficients except intercepts associated with given pair of outcomes are 0 (i.e., categories can be collapsed) (P-Value).  
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Table A3: Estimation results of Multinomial Logits (Dependent variable legform) 









(Standard. Error)  
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Hausmann tests of IIA assumption  
(Chi2 with 20 dof)b) 
0.027 2.270 -2.559  (Chi2 with 
24 dof)b 
-8.898 50.939*** 0.868   
Wald test for merge with Incentive  
(Chi2 with 9 dof)c) 
0.703     (Chi2 with 
11 dof)c) 
0.798      
Wald test for merge with Business ( 
Chi2 with 9 dof) c) 
0.007 0.186    (Chi2 with 
11 dof)c) 
0.014 0.138     
Wald test for merge with None  
(Chi2 with 9 dof) c) 
0.000 0.000 0.000  (Chi2 with 
11 dof)c) 
0.000 0.000 0.000   
Log likelihood  -371.89  -366.51 
Model chi – squared  142.97  152.36 
Pseudo R2  0.27  0.28 
Sample size  501  501 
Dependent variable: Form of Co-operation, Numbers in brackets are heteroskedasticity robust standard errors of the estimate, a) Ho: All 
coefficients associated with given variable(s) are 0 (P-Value) b) H0: Odds(Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives (X2 
values)c) Ho: All coefficients except intercepts associated with given pair of outcomes are 0 (i.e., categories can be collapsed) (P-Value).   
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Table A4: Estimation results of Multinomial Logits (Dependent variable legform) 
  Results Concerning small firms (less than 50 
employees) 









(Standard. Error)  
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dof) 









































































































































           
Hausmann tests of IIA assumption  
(Chi2 with 20 dof)b) 
1.226 0.797 0.615  (Chi2 with 
22 dof)b 
0.685 1.261 0.345   
Wald test for merge with Incentive  
(Chi2 with 9 dof)c) 
0.523     (Chi2 with 
10 dof)c) 
0.303      
Wald test for merge with Business ( 
Chi2 with 9 dof) c) 
0.004 0.131    (Chi2 with 
10 dof)c) 
0.061 0.281     
Wald test for merge with None  
(Chi2 with 9 dof) c) 
0.000 0.000 0.000  (Chi2 with 
10 dof)c) 
0.000 0.000 0.000   
Log likelihood  -281.60  -315.56 
Model chi – squared  136.43  133.23 
Pseudo R2  0.30  0.30 
Sample size  426  443 
Dependent variable: Form of Co-operation, Numbers in brackets are heteroskedasticity robust standard errors of the estimate, a) Ho: All 
coefficients associated with given variable(s) are 0 (P-Value) b) H0: Odds(Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives (X2 
values)c) Ho: All coefficients except intercepts associated with given pair of outcomes are 0 (i.e., categories can be collapsed) (P-Value).  
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Table A5: Estimation results of Multinomial Logits (Dependent variable legform) 
  Results excluding firm size Variables 
 Coefficient. 
(Standard. Error) 
Wald tests for 
independent variables
a)
  All Firms 




Business rel versus 
None 
P- Value 
(Chi2 with 3 dof) 































































        
Hausmann tests of IIA assumption  
(Chi2 with 18 dof)b) 
-3.797 1.309 0.044   
Wald test for merge with Incentive  
(Chi2 with 8 dof)c) 
0.740      
Wald test for merge with Business ( 
Chi2 with 8 dof) c) 
0.025 0.566     
Wald test for merge with None  
(Chi2 with 8 dof) c) 
0.000 0.000 0.000   
Log likelihood  -382.94 
Model chi – squared  135.01 
Pseudo R2  0.25 
Sample size  501 
Dependent variable: Form of Co-operation, Numbers in brackets are heteroskedasticity robust standard errors of the estimate, a) Ho: All 
coefficients associated with given variable(s) are 0 (P-Value) b) H0: Odds(Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives (X2 
values)c) Ho: All coefficients except intercepts associated with given pair of outcomes are 0 (i.e., categories can be collapsed) (P-Value).  
 
 